David Frum proposes a three-point common sense strategy in dealing with North Korea, with four specific action points for the US.

He interestingly suggests an involvement for NATO by arguing that its membership should be enlarged to include Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand and Singapore. That is not only a good way to help neutralize Pyongyang, it will also reinvigorate an organization whose members aren’t able to jointly contribute to its main project at the moment, Afghanistan. Failure there would no doubt create a key client state for NoKo’s nuclear exports and that prospect by itself should help NATO in redefining and expanding its mission.

There is however one very clear downside to Frum’s plans: the omnipresent and deep rooted fear to antagonize China. That will thwart some of the more adventurous proposals to take on North Korea and give NATO a mandate in the Pacific. Still, the time has come to put some unconventional approaches on the table.

NOTE: It was Tony Blair today who called on all NATO-members to help out in Afghanistan.

News and analysis at PJM, here, here and here. But also, check out the the Korea Liberator and its affiliated DPRK Studies.

James Na has launched a new blog with news and analysis about a divided peninsula: The Korea Liberator.

It’s hard to assess at exactly what stage North Korea is in terms of nuclear development, but today’s announcement that they now have nuclear weapons - didn’t we hear this before? - can hardly be encouraging. At the same time they are pulling out of the much hyped six-part talks which has been the cornerstone of the Bush administration’s North Korea policy.

The increased focus on Iran and its nuclear adventures as well as omitting North Korea from the latest State of the Union must have hurt Kim Jong-Il’s ego and this is once more evidence that we are dealing with a completely irrational bunch of people. Which given the subject matter is good reason to deal with this potentially explosive issue. And no, pre-emptive action is not an option; even with conventional weapons it would turn the Korean peninsula into a wasteland with enormous casualties in the south. Rapid deployment of North American missile defense, faster please.

NOTE: Check out this week's editon of Time with a cover story on the global nuclear smuggling ring.

A reader pointed me to Den Beste’s analysis on North Korea which supports the notion that patience is probably the best way to go. I have, to be honest, considered the patience option for a little while but in doing my analysis I came to the conclusion that what we are essentially trying to do is risk mitigation. And in using the facts available to us now, I happen to believe that there are just too many variables outside our control to sit back comfortably and let time take its course. We have some experience at that and over the past decade we have learned that the situation in North Korea could either implode or explode, and under both scenarios it remains very unclear what will happen to both the nuclear and conventional capabilities that the country has amassed. This is why I qualified my analysis last week with the statement that I did my assessment based on what we know. If the Bush team has information that leads them to believe that we can continue to play the patience game then that is fine, and we can assess progress based on developments that come from the regional negotiating effort.

Using my risk mitigation approach, I have tried to picture some alternative scenarios (and there are many, from exports of nuclear materials to renegade North Korean generals to conventional or nuclear missiles ending up intentionally or unintentionally in downtown Seoul) that I consider to be such risks that we may we want to start considering other options. Pre-emptive measures can be both dangerous and controversial, so I would not advocate taking these steps lightly. On the contrary, we would have to carefully assess any such approach together with regional players, especially South Korea before moving forward. My impression is that with the current approach we are moving forward slowly and in doing so we may be ignoring some serious perils along the way.

A trip around the blogosphere as well as close examination of multiple news sources has not brought me any closer to a firm understanding of where the Bush team is going with North Korea. In addition, there were some conflicting messages earlier this week and they did not really raise the overall confidence level I have about this administration dealing effectively with this issue. The completion of operations in Iraq would allow for a new focal point in disarming rogue nations as I have argued here before, but to date very little progress has been made, or so it appears. As Pyongyang is upping the rhetoric and physical evidence of a growing nuclear capability is readily available, it is time to do an inventory and assess where we are and what particular hurdles we are facing.

Regional Solutions
The “regional solution card” is the card that the Bush administration has been playing to date. This effectively means getting China to buy into the seriousness of the situation and get the Chinese leadership on the same page as the US administration. On the face of it a very sensible approach, the Chinese are in a position to do so as North Korea relies to a very large extent on economic support from Beijing and the Chinese have obviously very little to gain from a wayward nuclear power next door. Apparently, Beijing has interrupted the oil supply to North Korea for a few days earlier this year, just to show Kim Jong Il and his team who’s calling the shots. This is an unconfirmed report but it underlines the potential that Beijing has as a key partner in this matter. Beijing in turn has a clear incentive to become more pro-active. There is of course the potential refugee issue but more importantly there is a risk that in China’s absence other regional powers may resolve to increase their leverage by developing nuclear or other military capabilities. These options would be perfectly reasonable for countries such as Japan and South Korea in the absence of a fully fledged US-Sino solution. There may be ways to go for both nations in this respect, but the potential that they might, should alert any Chinese leader let alone a leader like Hu Jintao who has just been anointed and for whom it is imperative to establish hard-line credentials going forward.
On the other end of the regional map are South Korea and Japan and to date they have not exactly been solid players. While the proximity of big population centers in South Korea to North Korean arms is good reason for them to be careful, it should not preclude a tougher position vis-à-vis their fellow Koreans. The South Korean government should know that its security to a very large extent is backed-up by the USA, a luxury that North Korea no longer has now that the Soviet-Union has evaporated and China has changed its stance towards communist rogue states. Japan’s positioning has been very disappointing, the velvet glove approach is something that just does not work, yet the Japanese have been far too accommodating with Pyongyang, resulting in calls this week by Japan’s Defence Agency for a much harder approach.

The problem with the regional approach is that it so far not only has failed to yield any results, it is not even clear as to what a potential result will look like. It may yet be another long process which takes place behind the scenes and at the negotiation table with no clear end point and no clear path of action that will lead to disarming North Korea. In fact, it may be a tool used by the Bush team to procrastinate on this issue in the hope that it will at least produce some results down the line without running any immediate risks.

The Multilateral Approach
There may be appetite under the Iraqi Freedom detractors such as Russia, France, Germany and Canada to make good with the Bush administration. And not only that, some of these countries have a direct interest in the potentially explosive situation, Russia borders on North Korea and Canada may well be within in range of North Korean missiles in the not so distant future. If the US stays away from any military option these countries may well be willing to work with Bush and the UN and the IAEA to put pressure on North Korea with a view of disabling its nuclear program. Yet, even if there was such a clear willingness and multilateral understanding, it is hard to see how it would translate into the desired results. Arms inspectors and resolutions simply do not work when you are dealing with totalitarian dictators and Kim has nixed previous deals that were made in a multilateral context.

Regime Change: Action
One other option is the Rumsfeld Card, although it is not entirely clear how it is going to be played. One option might be to choke the regime in Pyongyang to death with a very drastic package of sanctions. The net of such an approach would no doubt be a desperate attack of the North Koreans on their Southern brethren, prompting the US to step in, resulting in significant numbers of refugees flooding into China, many of whom may already have fled to China in the wake of the sanctions in the first place. Whatever the outcome, the start of hostilities by North Korea may result in substantial casualty numbers and most of these casualties will likely be South Korean and civilian. So given this likely scenario, a very drastic sanction package does not seem to be an ideal approach. Nor does a moderate sanction package as they have a reputation for not working.

The other option would the pre-emptive strike. There is very little analysis as to the parameters of such an action as opposed to the seemingly endless strategic papers and maps that were available prior to the actual invasion of Iraq. If the Bush administration is serious about disarming the “Axis of Evil”, then a pre-emptive strike on North Korea is something that should be given serious consideration given the complete failure of all diplomatic efforts to date, knowing that we have been at it for well over 10 years. There should be a serious analysis of the merits of pre-emptive action, disabling the capabilities of the North Korean command structure at the outset of such a conflict could well provide a key to a quick resolution of the crisis without running the risk of huge casualty numbers. Again, there is little material available that would allow us to do this analysis but purely from a policy perspective it is an option that should definitely be on the table.

The Domestic Angle
Very little has been written about the domestic appetite for another armed conflict. While Bush is savoring the clear victory in Iraq and moving over to domestic issues with an upcoming election in mind, it may be that another armed conflict with a potential for far greater casualty numbers than Iraq may not work with the 2004 presidential election in mind. Democratic opponents will (and some already have) no doubt jump on this but Bush may gamble that North Korea will not resonate with the American voters and that continued talks and regional approaches may be sufficient for now. While taking such a risk is understandable, it may cost him a few points during the upcoming campaign and debates. Any serious deterioration in the potentially explosive relation with North Korea may damage his campaign.

What Next?
The regional solution contains far too many variables for Washington to control and it is not likely to lead to any meaningful results in the near term. Things have been quiet on this front this week, but today the Chinese have set the regional train in motion again.

A surrender and focus by the US on preventing nuclear exports from North Korea only, as was suggested earlier this week, is hard to implement and would mean a very disappointing retreat from the policy of rolling back rogue nations. If we want to get to an outcome that would resolve the issue once and for all we need to seriously look at pre-empting this threatening situation in a manner that would minimize casualties and have the support of North Korea’s immediate neighbors. Not an easy formula but unless there is something that we do not know, it could well be the formula that ultimately needs to be applied.

Preparing a somewhat longer post on North Korea I stumbled across this piece of market news. North Korea is tapping the capital markets by raising money to prop up their bankrupt economy through a bond offering, but instead of interest bondholders will get an expression of affection from the people’s republic. Now there’s a great return on your investment, and, if you win in a lottery you may even get some interest after all.

This is, believe it or not, for real and the manner in which the funds are raised is reason for serious concern. It appears that the North Korean government is finding subscribers for the bond offering by approaching the sizeable Korean community living in Japan, many of whom are sympathetic to Pyongyang. You can compare this to Osama bin Laden raising funds in the US among sympathetic American muslims, following which he can apply the proceeds to further intimidate the US. Or, what about Fidel Castro tapping the market among Hispanic Americans who see some benefit in helping out his flagging communist dictatorship? This is evidence of the extremely soft and appeasing attitude that the Japanese have taken towards North Korea. The regime in Pyongyang has kidnapped Japanese citizens most of whom have not returned, but the Japanese authorities do not blink an eye if the same regime uses Japan as a base to raise financing? This is a piece of evidence that the so-called regional solutions have a very limited chance of success, at least where it concerns working with Japan. Apparently some Japanese agree and are asking for tougher stance vis-à-vis Pyongyang.

In addition to Den Beste, there was another great link over the weekend by OxBlog referring to my Regime Raiding Rumsfeld piece. That title would do well in any British tabloid and I could not resist using it once I had created it. In fact, I guarantee you I will recycle it once Rummy takes on the tyrant of the island.

Regarding Pyongyang, it appears that we are making some progress by trying to involve the Chinese in a so-called regional solution, but I remain somewhat doubtful over the speed with which this can be achieved. Remember, China is in the midst of a power change and it takes at least a number of years for a clear decision making structure to crystallize in Beijing. Hu Jintao as the new President has to walk a very tight line as he will have to a large extent answer to former President Jiang Zemin who continues to chair the Central Military Committee. It is hard to get a clear decision out of Zhongnanhai at any time, but with the shifting power balance and yes, SARS, it will be challenging to get the Chinese leadership to commit to a clear path of dealing with North Korea which inevitably involves a move toward regime change in Pyongyang. Both SARS and North Korea will require the Chinese leadership to increasingly work with, and listen to, outsiders and for a new leader to be teaming up with the Bush administration is not exactly the most logical approach to establish strong leadership credentials in China, on the contrary. In the meantime, Colin Powell is today looking at yet another plan from the North Koreans that would ultimately deal with the nuclear issues.

The North Korea issue dropped off my radar screen a little bit given the developments in Iraq and Syria, but things started moving again last week, although I was not entirely clear how to transform everything into a Peaktalk post. Yet, this piece of news brings it back right to the epicenter of attention and to these pages. A secret memo from Donald Rumsfeld calling for regime change in North Korea was leaked Monday. As I have argued before, North Korea is topping the list of places requiring immediate attention, especially now that Iraq appears to have been settled and Syria is back in its cage following some brisk and unanimous rhetoric from the Bush team. The Rumsfeld memo however reveals an old rift over North Korea in the administration. The State Department is favoring talks with North Korea, whereas the Rumsfeld team is rightly opting for a more vigorous approach, which does not necessarily mean military action. The lesson from Iraq is evident in that weapons inspections and prolonged talks do not work. My arguments last Friday over asymmetrical deals between democracies and terrorist organizations can easily be applied to agreements between democracies and rogue nations, and if there is ever evidence that agreements of this nature are not honored it is the failed implementation of the deals the Clinton administration cut with the hermit in Pyongyang.

Swift regime change in close co-operation with the Chinese (and for that reason alone a direct military approach would not be likely) rather than talks are the most logical step forward. What makes it easier compared to Iraq is that we will not have to engage in nation building afterwards, we can just hand the keys to Pyongyang to South Korea and invite them to dust off their reunification handbooks which they will surely have somewhere.

So we are giving the UN Security Council another shot at defusing a crisis. Today the council has decided to start holding consultations regarding the developing nuclear crisis in North Korea. I have argued before on this blog that the hermit kingdom should be next on the list once Iraq is disarmed. The question is how this is to be achieved and already the discussions have started as to who should take the lead in this important effort. The Chinese commented as follows:

“We have decided we would have consultations, but I don't know what will be accomplished,” the Chinese Ambassador to the UN, Wang Yingfan, said after the meeting. China has been calling on Washington to hold direct talks with the North.

So, the Chinese are taking a realistic approach here by happily anointing the US to take the lead, making the assumption that the UN would probably not be equipped to make any significant progress. It is interesting though that China’s suggestion is the complete opposite of what Bush suggested not too long ago, namely a regional solution with the assistance of especially the Chinese. A new chapter on multi-lateral diplomacy is being written and it will again be a very interesting one.

With Saddam demanding all the headlines, someone in Asia is getting very agitated over the fact that he is not getting the attention he thinks he deserves and needs. He has responded by issuing a few wacky threats and firing off a few missiles into the sea. Some have branded Kim Jong Il of North Korea the Michael Jackson of international politics, I just feel better by calling him what he effectively is: a very dangerous tyrant.

I usually do not get very nauseous over the daily news but that changes when the threat hits home directly. When CIA-director Tenet during a Senate hearing a few weeks ago confirmed that North Korean missiles could reach the North American mainland it didn’t take a lot to figure out what that meant: everyone from Alaska to California is at risk and given that me and my family are right in that target area made me quite uneasy. I have no doubt the CIA has done some analysis on the accuracy of North Korean missile technology but I think we can assume that something that is aimed at Los Angeles would end up in Vancouver and something aimed at Seattle would end up in Klamath Falls. We’re all in the line of fire.

During last week’s press conference, when prompted about North Korea, Bush qualified the North Korean issue as a regional one. The critics of the President wasted no time to explain to the rest of the world that North Korea was everything but a regional problem and that by focusing on Iraq Bush had his priorities wrong. Well, the fact of the matter is that they did not really understand what Bush was saying. He was effectively making the point that, as opposed to Iraq, there are a number of countries that border directly on North Korea and that they therefore have an equally important stake in containing North Korea. They happen to be a former superpower, a future superpower, both with nuclear capabilities, an economic powerhouse and an upcoming economic powerhouse all of whom have fairly strong ties with the U.S. and who all stand to benefit from a swift removal of Pyonyang’s version of Saddam. In other words: "Russia, China, Japan and South Korea are fairly powerful nations with an equally strong interest and the U.S. is working closely with these regional power in dealing with North Korea and it is nice for a change that America can work with a base of regional partners in cleaning up the mess rather than going it alone".

On the face of it the White House is making an argument that is not great but I think it holds water, for now. In Iraq the U.S. has very little partners to work with and in Asia it has. A regime change in North Korea would be directed at North Korea only and contrary to Iraq there are no regional issues to speak of, the “catalyst for change” argument does not apply here. I also believe (and I hope this is the case) that the Bush administration is working on a priority based list and we all know that when the “Axis of Evil” was launched as a concept it meant that each constituent would get its turn at some point. We are currently working on Iraq, Iran and North Korea will follow shortly. On a different level the administration must have a sense that North Korea is not as yet plugged into terror networks but that is an assumption that has a limited shelf life. The more desperate Kim gets, the more desperate his moves and exporting some of his technology elsewhere is only a matter of time.

All in all, we are being asked to make a lot of assumptions with regards to North Korea and its nuclear adventures. The efforts of the Clinton administration have been a solid waste of time so we now have to build our hope on this administration following through on its commitment to deal with the Axis of Evil. I will buy into their strategy for now but want to give my recommendation for the sequence of events: 1. North Korea, 2. Iran.