One of the reasons that I haven’t blogged about the devastation in the Gulf Coast area is that there is little that I can add to the various reports that we have seen over the past few days. In fact, it was surprising to see how much was written about it by numerous bloggers without really contributing anything that wasn’t already covered elsewhere. That however is changing right now, with analysis and finger pointing well underway. Andrew Sullivan provides a few interesting comments as well as a link to Mark Kleiman who has some pointed questions about maintaining the flood controls and levees, and, who should be bearing the associated costs. These are valid points as it puts into focus how the wealthiest nation in the world failed to implement a technically viable defense against the water in area that was known to pose some risks, to put it mildly.

That’s again something where my background comes into play, The Netherlands being a country that was essentially wrested from the water with nearly half of the country still being well below sea level. And it wasn’t that long ago (1953) that a disastrous flood devastated the south-western province of Zeeland (the one that gave its name to that country down under), killing some eighteen-hundred people and ruining a vibrant economy. It resulted in the construction of one of the world’s most ambitious infrastructure projects called the Deltawerken or Deltaworks:

Twenty days after the flood of 1953, the Delta commission was inaugurated. The commission would give advice about the execution of the Deltaplan, that would, in the long run, increase the safety of the Delta area. Although safety was the number one priority, the seaways De Nieuwe Waterweg and the Western Schelde would have to stay open, because of the economic importance of the ports of Rotterdam and Antwerp. In order to be able to build dams in the rivers' mouths, some auxiliary dams would first have to be built in the Zandkreek, the Krammer, the Grevelingen, and the Volkerak. These dams were known as 'compartment dams', since they would divide the large area of water into multiple compartments. In 1959, the Delta Law was passed, in order to organise the construction of the dams. The building of the 'Deltaworks' was such an enormous project, that it was sometimes referred to as the 'eighth wonder of the world' - and not without good reason.

The project was executed during the 1960s and 1970s and many Sunday trips during my childhood were spent visiting the construction progress of the many dams, dykes and locks that were part of this phenomenal project. The Deltaworks were completed during the 1980s and they work as there haven’t been any floods of note since 1953.

Of course there were downsides to all of this and to address Kleiman’s issues directly, for the Dutch it was a matter of national survival and there consequently was never a real debate about it being a national or provincial responsibility, something that’s hardly ever an issue as Dutch provinces do not have the authority to levy income taxes. The project was therefore almost exclusively funded by the central government and there were no creative project financing structures with private sector participation which would probably be part of the deal were it funded today. The cost over time of course exceeded the initial budgets by far, and some of that increased cost resulted from some typically Dutch pragmatic solutions that were devised around some highly controversial parts of the project:

There was some unexpected resistance against the construction of a closed dam, because people were concerned that the unique salt water environment of the Eastern Schelde would cease to exist. Specifically, not only the environment, but also the fishing industry would suffer from a dam. In 1976, the Dutch government agreed to an alternative plan: instead of building a closed dam, an open barrier would be built, containing a number of sluices that would only be closed during heavy storms and high water levels. The unique freshwater environment and the favourable fishery conditions would be maintained. Sixty-two openings, each forty metres wide, would be installed to allow as much salt water through as possible.

The net result of it all was a safe barrier against the seas but it also helped to create one of the most powerful Dutch government departments, the Ministry of Transportation and Waterworks, which once the project was completed became reluctant to see itself reduced to a regular ministry with a much smaller budget. With rising water levels as a result of global warming the department has of course enthusiastically embraced the opportunity to obtain budget increases in order to see to it that the Dutch water defenses meet 21st century standards.

This experience doesn’t give a really clear answer to what Washington (together with Jackson and Baton Rouge) should do now to prevent a repeat of the Katrina flooding. But, there is a viable technical model that can be worked from and there should be ways to share the risks of such an ambitious undertaking between federal, state as well as private participants. Above all, the affected areas need to get on their feet and there’s nothing that works better to fire up an economy then huge investments in infrastructural projects that take many years to complete.

UPDATE: John Hawkins has some questions about the cost of it all too.