Ever since the recent suicide bombings in Turkey a lot has been written about al-Qaeda and its strategy. There seems to be a reasonable level of confusion about where the group currently is tactically and financially, and some question its ability to ever launch the major attack on US soil we have been anticipating since 9/11. And then there is some debate over the likelihood that the group is damaging itself with bomb attacks in which many innocent Muslim civilians are killed. There are two things that we should differentiate I think. One is the group’s strategy and current capability to execute on that strategy; the other one is the market for its ideas or: the feeding ground on which it relies for support and recruitment.

Donald Sensing has pointed out to us that al-Qaeda lacks a clear strategy, Steven Den Beste argued that in waging war against the infidels the group seeks to underline that they are true Muslims and in doing so they expect that divine intervention will manifest itself at some point during the battle and assist in accomplishing the goals that underlie their struggle or jihad. The particular goals of that battle remain vague, but given the evidence to date it seems that the re-establishment of the caliphate encompassing all Muslim countries is the core of the al-Qaeda vision. A battle to convert the rest of the world to Islam would no doubt follow shortly upon the establishment of such a strong and unified caliphate. Essentially, the strategy to achieve these goals is two-tiered: firstly, attack in Muslim countries where there is religious and historical significance such as Saudi Arabia or where there is an opportunity because of the unique political and religious circumstances. In the latter case we can think about secular Turkey, but also about countries like Algeria, Egypt and Pakistan where political instability is easy to foment. If that instability is achieved and exploited in countries with economic and demographic mass, all the better. The other tier is to attack the allies of those that al-Qaeda seeks to unseat, the United States has been the one nation singled out for this treatment, more recently the UK has become a target.

When you think about it, this strategy is not overly clever as it means spreading resources around various areas which may heighten the local impact and surprise the enemy, but it does not ensure a rapid regime change in for instance Saudi-Arabia, as a more concentrated and sustained effort would be required for that. Furthermore, the damage inflicted upon the US to date has resulted in a strong counter-attack that has not only affected al-Qaeda’s international capabilities, but also its on the ground strength in the Muslim world, think about the ways in which Pakistan and Saudi-Arabia are now co-operating in the war on terror. From that point of view their strategy has failed and it seems the group is reeling from this strategic miscalculation that was grounded in the belief that if we can defeat one superpower - the USSR in Afghanistan - then we can take on another. That brings me to the capabilities it currently has. Phil Carter a few weeks ago pointed out that al-Qaeda has been transformed from the pre 9/11 al-Qaeda 1.0 to al-Qaeda 2.0, the latter being the current edition that has been hampered in its operational capabilities and the evidence of that is that we now see relatively insignificant attacks on dispersed goals in the Muslim world and not any major attacks in the west. Carter goes on to warn us that complacency on our part could lead to the very lethal al-Qaeda 3.0, again conducting large scale operations. There are some merits in this line of thinking and I believe it is correct. The war on terror has yielded some early fruits and al-Qaeda has suffered some major setbacks. We will see some scattered attacks in the near future - the theory of an al-Qaeda franchise is instructive here - but four targeted attacks in one particular place are evidence to me that in spite of reduced operational effectiveness the group has not exactly lost its focus. On the contrary, by picking Jewish and Western targets in secular Turkey the group is pretty much underlining what we all think is their binding rationale: fighting a religious war by taking on the infidels and chose a locale where the impact may further the group’s basic strategic goals.

It is tempting to write al-Qaeda off as some fringe group like Baader-Meinhof, or even the IRA, killing innocent members of the people they claim to represent, in turn alienating those very groups. Maybe, but it occurs to me that both Baader-Meinhof and the IRA were in the end irrelevant groups because they could not realistically claim that they represented a cause shared by a sufficiently large cross-section of the population on whose behalf they said they were acting. There is a lot of resentment, poverty and disillusion in the Arab world for al-Qaeda to feed on. I have pointed before on these pages to the economic mechanics at work here, and they in turn are compounded by the demographic trends in most of the Muslim world. As some look at this conflict from their background in religion, I always look at it from my basic academic training in the field of economic history. My conclusion is that the al-Qaeda strategy may not be perfect and their operational capabilities may have suffered, the market for their ideas is still pretty much alive. And let us be clear on the innocents: Muslims killed in Riyadh or Istanbul can easily be qualified as collateral damage, in the first case they were westernized Arabs living in wealthy surroundings, and in the Istanbul case they were secular Turks who worked together with Jews and Brits. The argument that attacks in the Muslim world alienate Muslims thus does not hold water, on the contrary, the Muslims that die have been tainted by what they were and who they associated with. My bet is that the uneducated masses continue to have a deep fascination with the Osama bin-Laden figure as some sort of mystical folk hero; if evidence is required I would like to point to the Osama puppets currently available in the Palestinian Territories and the appearance of his likeness on T-shirts and shops in places as far as Indonesia. To the extent they are educated they have either attended madrassahs or are heavily indoctrinated by radical groups such as Hamas, the latter having successfully ventured into providing social services and education. And although Hamas is not al-Qaeda, they are a group that has perfected its strategy by underpinning the indiscriminate physical struggle with nurturing the grassroots of that battle. The moment al-Qaeda figures out how to venture into healthcare, education and related social services, and at some point they will, there will be real trouble in the Arab world and beyond.

The Muslim world is facing a fork in the road. Much like the Weimar Republic in the 1920s and 1930s, the choice is between totalitarianism and making a real effort to achieve a functioning, free and healthy democracy which means that compromises and co-operation are to be made working principles. Not an easy task. The Bush administration is aware of what could be a painful and lengthy implementation of democratic principles in Iraq as it requires more than putting a ballot-box on every street corner. So sweeping away the old order with democracy is not easy nor, as in the case of Saudi-Arabia, is it going to happen anytime soon. Indeed the very adoption of democracy may be the exact venue for radical groups to obtain power; Hitler triumphed in a democratic election as did the Islamic Front in Algeria in the early 1990s. Al-Qaeda and its political affiliates are aiming at destabilizing the old order through continued attacks and violence, knowing very well that they stand to benefit from a direct collapse of the old order, or they may benefit indirectly in a scenario where democracy replaces the old regime. We may not yet be at this point, but if historic analogies have any value we should maybe consider that al-Qaeda might adapt some worldly functions in order to realize its religious goals.

Not discounting the progress to date, I have a difficult time seeing how the current evolutionary phase in which al-Qaeda finds itself is evidence of the group’s demise. And even if they will fall apart or be destroyed there continues to be a huge opportunity to exploit their theories of a caliphate that will annihilate the old order, eliminate the Jewish state and send the Westerners packing. If not the elusive Osama bin-Laden himself, then any other leader who can translate his ideas into a more pragmatic approach can step into his void and catch the divine and popular winds that have been propelling the case for change in the Muslim world. That scenario would come very close to al-Qaeda 3.0.